We investigate the implications and logical relations between progressivity (a principle of distributive justice) and merging-proofness (a strategic principle) in taxation. By means of two characterization results, we show that these two principles are intimately related, despite their different nature. In particular, we show that, in the presence of continuity and consistency (a widely accepted framework for taxation) progressivity implies merging-proofness and that the converse implication holds if we add an additional strategic principle extending the scope of merging-proofness to a multilateral setting. By considering operators on the space of taxation rules, we also show that progressivity is slightly more robust than merging-proofness.
Introduction
In modern welfare states, income tax is a major source of state funds and an essential policy measure for the enhancement of distributive justice. In the framework introduced by O'Neill (1982) and Young (1988) , we focus on a specific principle of distributive justice, known as progressivity, which says that, for any pair of agents, the one with higher income should face a tax rate at least as high as the rate the other faces. 1 We investigate the implications of this principle as well as its relation to another principle that prevents any gain (tax cut) from strategic merging among taxpayers. This second principle, called merging-proofness, has been studied in this same context by de Frutos (1999), Ju (2003) , Ju et al. (2007) and Moreno-Ternero (2007) , among others, and in similar contexts by Sprumont (2005) and Moulin (2008) , among others.
Merging-proofness is an axiom introduced from a strategic consideration independent of any principle of distributive justice. However, we find that it is in fact related to the progressivity principle. Based on two characterization results imposing either progressivity or merging-proofness, as well as some standard axioms in the literature, we show that (essentially) any progressive tax rule is merging-proof. This is an extra advantage of imposing progressivity. 2 Conversely, we show that a suitable "multilateral" extension of mergingproofness allows to ensure progressive taxation too.
A recent study by Thomson and Yeh (2008) gives a novel classification of tax rules and axioms based on operators on the space of tax rules. The robustness of an axiom can be tested by studying its preservation through the application of operators. 3 There is a natural operator, known as "minimal burden operator", preserving progressivity but not mergingproofness. We find an additional, yet mild axiom that helps merging-proofness be preserved. The other known operators preserve either both or none of the two principles. Thus, our analysis shows that progressivity is slightly more robust than merging-proofness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and basic concepts. In Section 3, we define the axioms. In Section 4, we state and prove the characterization results and the logical relations between the axioms. In Section 5, we state and prove our results on operators. We conclude in Section 6 with some further insights. For a smooth passage, we defer some proofs and provide them in the appendix.
Model and basic concepts
We study taxation problems in a variable population model. The set of potential taxpayers, or agents, is identified with the set of natural numbers N. Let N be the set of finite subsets of N, with generic element N. We denote by R N + the cross-product of |N| copies of R + indexed by the members of N. 4 For each i ∈ N, let y i ∈ R + be i's (taxable) income and y ≡ (y i ) i∈N the income profile. A (taxation) problem is a triple consisting of a population N ∈ N , an income profile y ∈ R N + , and a tax revenue T ∈ R + such that ∑ i∈N y i ≥ T . Let Y ≡ ∑ i∈N y i . To avoid unnecessary complication, we assume Y = ∑ i∈N y i > 0. Let D N be the set of taxation problems with population N and D ≡ N∈N D N . Given a problem (N, y, T ) ∈ D, a tax profile is a vector x ∈ R N satisfying the following two conditions: (i) for each i ∈ N, 0 ≤ x i ≤ y i and (ii) ∑ i∈N x i = T . We refer to (i) as boundedness and (ii) as balance. 5 A (taxation) rule on D, R : D → N∈N R N , associates 2 The most widely referred advantage of progressive taxation, and perhaps the main reason for its ubiquity in income tax schedules worldwide, is that it typically reduces income inequality. The connection between progressive taxation and inequality reduction that had long been perceived by a number of authors in the literature on tax functions (e.g., Musgrave and Thin, 1948; Fellman, 1976; Jakobsson, 1976; Eichhorn et al., 1984) , has also been recently scrutinized and properly established for the framework we analyze here in a companion paper (Ju and Moreno-Ternero, 2008). 3 Preservation of an axiom means that if a rule satisfies an axiom so does the rule obtained by applying the operator. 4 Alternatively, the superscript N may refer to a set pertaining to the agents in N. Which interpretation is intended should be unambiguous from the context. 5 Note that boundedness implies that each agent with zero income pays zero tax.
with each problem (N, y, T ) ∈ D a tax profile R (N, y, T ) for the problem. For each N ∈ N , each M ⊆ N, and each z ∈ R N , let z M ≡ (z i ) i∈M. We now provide some examples of rules. The head tax distributes the tax burden equally subject to no agent paying more than her income. The leveling tax equalizes post-tax income across agents subject to no agent being subsidized. The flat tax equalizes tax rates across agents. These three rules are examples of rules in the following family introduced by Young (1987) .
. We call f a parametric representation of R.
Parametric representations (also parametric rules) are continuous in revenue but not necessarily in income. When a parametric representation is jointly continuous in both arguments, it is called a continuous parametric representation and the rule represented by it is called a continuous parametric rule. The three rules mentioned earlier are such rules. They have the following parametric representations:
• Head tax: f H (λ , y) = min{− 1 λ , y}, for each λ ∈ R − and each y ∈ R + .
• Leveling tax: f L (λ , y) = max{y − 1 λ , 0}, for each λ ∈ R + and each y ∈ R + .
• Flat tax: f F (λ , y) = λ · y, for each λ ∈ [0, 1] and each y ∈ R + .
Axioms
We now define our two main axioms.
Progressivity postulates that, for any pair of agents, the one with higher income should face a tax rate at least as high as the rate the other faces.
Progressivity. For each (N, y, T ) ∈ D and each i, j ∈ N, if 0 < y i ≤ y j , R i (N, y, T )/y i ≤ R j (N, y, T )/y j .
Our second axiom prevents a rule from being manipulated by a pair of agents through merging their incomes.
Merging-proofness. For each (N, y, T ) ∈ D and each pair i, j ∈ N with i = j, if y ∈ R N\{ j} + is such that y i = y i + y j and y N\{i, j} = y N\{i, j} , R i (N, y, T ) + R j (N, y, T ) ≤ R i (N\{ j}, y , T ). 6 We will investigate logical relations between the two axioms. We will invoke some of the following standard axioms in the process. 7 First, any two agents with equal incomes should pay equal taxes.
Equal treatment of equals. For each (N, y, T ) ∈ D and each pair i, j ∈ N with y i = y j , R i (N, y, T ) = R j (N, y, T ). 6 We consider only pairwise merging. This restriction is for simplicity and without loss of generality. The same results are obtained considering merging incomes of more than two agents into the total income of a single representative agent. We consider later multiple representative agents and formulate a stronger axiom. This axiom is much stronger as we show in Lemma 2 and Proposition 2. 7 We refer readers to Thomson (2003 Thomson ( , 2006 for a detailed discussion of these axioms.
Next is the stronger requirement that tax payments should not depend on the names of taxpayers.
Anonymity. For each (N, y, T ) ∈ D, each N ∈ N , each bijection π : N → N , and each i ∈ N, R π(i) (N , (y π(i) ) i∈N , T ) = R i (N, y, T ).
The next axiom expresses the robustness of a rule under the departure of some agents with their contributions. Apply the rule to a problem and imagine some agents paying their tax contributions and leaving. The axiom says that if we revise the situation and apply the rule to it, it should assign to each of the remaining agents the same contribution as it had originally. Finally, the next axiom says that small changes in incomes or revenue do not produce a jump in tax payments.
Continuity. For each N ∈ N , each (N, y, T ) ∈ D N and each sequence {(N, y n , T n ) : n ∈ N} in D N , if (y n , T n ) converges to (y, T ) then R (N, y n , T n ) converges to R (N, y, T ).
Characterizations and logical relations among axioms
We will show that among rules satisfying consistency and continuity, progressivity implies merging-proofness. This follows from the characterizations of two families of rules imposing either progressivity or merging-proofness. The following lemma is useful for the characterizations, as well as for establishing the converse implication that merging-proofness, together with an additional axiom extending its scope to a multilateral setting, also implies progressivity. Lemma 1. Merging-proofness and consistency together imply anonymity.
The proof is provided in the appendix. The next two properties of parametric representations are crucial in our characterization.
A parametric representation f : Proof. Statement 1. Note that progressivity implies equal treatment of equals. Young (1987, Theorem 1) shows that the continuous parametric rules are the only rules satisfying consistency, equal treatment of equals, and continuity. Thus, using Young's result, we just need to show that a parametric rule is progressive if and only if it has a parametric representation that is superhomogeneous in income. Let R be a parametric rule and f :
which shows the progressivity of R. ♦ Proof. It suffices to show that superhomogeneity in income implies superadditivity in income. To do so, let y 0 and y 0 be such that 0 < y 0 ≤ y 0 . Let α ≡ (y 0 + y 0 )/y 0 . Then, by superhomogeneity, f λ , αy
Remark 1. Without consistency and continuity, the logical relation between progressivity and merging-proofness in Corollary 1 does not hold, as shown by Example 1 in Section 5.
Note that any convex function f : R → R, whose graph passes through the origin, is superhomogeneous. Hence by Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, any rule with a continuous parametric representation that is convex in income is progressive and merging-proof. As mentioned above, both the leveling tax and the flat tax have such representations. Thus, they are both progressive and merging-proof. The same argument applies to two other classical tax rules proposed by Cohen-Stuart and Cassel (formulated as rules in our model by Young, 1988) .
Corollary 1 shows that, among rules satisfying consistency and continuity, progressivity implies merging-proofness. However, the converse does not hold. 11 To fully understand the logical relation and, in particular, how much weaker than progressivity merging-proofness is, we search for a condition that fills the gap between the two axioms. We accomplish this aim through the next investigation of "multilateral merging" and, more precisely, the nonmanipulability axiom that arises when we focus on the special case in which agents merging have uniform incomes.
Merging-proofness pertains to merging the incomes of two agents, or any set of agents in its standard formulation, into the total income of a "single" representative. One may well consider the possibility of "multiple" representatives instead. That is, merging incomes of a set of agents into incomes of a proper "subset" of agents with the total income unchanged. Such merging is said to be multilateral. The next axiom says that no group of agents can reduce their total tax payment through multilateral merging.
Multilateral Merging-Proofness. For each (N, y, T ) ∈ D, each S ⊆ N and each non-empty
. Evidently, this axiom implies merging-proofness. It turns out to be much stronger as we show that multilateral merging-proofness, together with consistency, implies the following dual axiom of merging-proofness that has also been frequently considered in the literature 
Multilateral merging-proofness and consistency together imply splitting-proofness.
Proof. Let R be a rule satisfying multilateral merging-proofness and consistency. Let (N, y, T ) ∈ D. For ease of notation, assume, without loss of generality, that N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n} and consider the problem in which agents 1 and 2 merge their incomes into 1's income, i.e., (N\{2}, (y 1 +y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n ), T ) ∈ D. Note that (N, y, T ) is obtained after agent 1 in (N\{2}, (y 1 + y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n ), T ) splits her income y 1 + y 2 into y 1 and y 2 . We aim to show that R 1 (N, y, T ) + R 2 (N, y, T ) ≥ R 1 (N\{2}, (y 1 + y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n ), T ). To do so, let us consider the auxiliary problem in which agents 1 and 2 transfer their incomes to a new agent n + 1, but do not leave, i.e., (N ∪ {n + 1}, (0, 0, y 3 , . . . , y n , y 1 + y 2 ), T ) ∈ D. The multilateral merger of the incomes of 1, 2, and n + 1 into the incomes y 1 and y 2 of 1 and 2 yields (N, y, T ). Thus, applying multilateral merging-proofness to this auxiliary problem and the original one, as well as invoking boundedness, we obtain
On the other hand, by consistency, R n+1 (N ∪{n+1}, (0, 0, y 3 , . . . , y n , y 1 +y 2 ), T ) = R n+1 ({3, . . . , n+1}, (y 3 , . . . , y n , y 1 + y 2 ) , T ).
(2) Because multilateral merging-proofness implies merging-proofness, Lemma 1 guarantees that R satisfies anonymity, which implies that R n+1 ({3, . . . , n + 1}, (y 3 , . . . , y n , y 1 + y 2 ) , T ) = R 1 (N\{2}, (y 1 + y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n ), T ).
Combining (1)-(3), we get R 1 (N, y, T ) + R 2 (N, y, T ) ≥ R 1 (N\{2}, (y 1 + y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n ), T ), as desired. Since the argument would have also worked for any other pair of agents, instead of 1 and 2, we have just shown that R satisfies splitting-proofness.
As a result, we have the following:
Proposition 2. A rule satisfies multilateral merging-proofness and consistency if and only if
it is the flat tax.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the flat tax satisfies multilateral merging-proofness and consistency. Conversely, let R be a consistent rule satisfying multilateral mergingproofness. In particular, R satisfies merging-proofness. Now, by Lemma 2, R also satisfies splitting-proofness. It follows from Ju et al., (2007, Theorem 9) that R is the flat tax.
We have therefore shown that among the consistent rules, multilateral merging-proofness is much stronger than progressivity. A technical relaxation of it, however, focusing on a special type of multilateral merging, will turn out to fill the gap between progressivity and An implicit assumption made in our formulation of multilateral merging-proofness (also present in the formulation of "reallocation-proofness" studied widely in numerous models; see Ju et al., 2007) is that a group of agents who successfully manipulate tax allocations, and reduce their total tax payment, can always share the tax cut so that they all benefit. The validity of this assumption depends on how capable agents are of reaching a cooperative agreement to share the tax cut. Uniformity preserving merges are a special type of merges where this assumption is arguably most valid. The reason being that in this case all agents involved in a merge are equal ex-ante and ex-post, and so the equal division of the total benefit from the merge constitutes a focal agreement to be reached, provided they accept the basic equal treatment principle. Thus, uniformity preserving multilateral merging-proofness can be considered as a natural weakening of multilateral merging-proofness, when guaranteeing a post-manipulation agreement is important. Now we are ready to state our next result:
Proposition 3. Let R be a rule satisfying consistency and continuity. Then, the following statements are equivalent: 1. R satisfies progressivity; 2. R satisfies merging-proofness and uniformity preserving multilateral merging-proofness;
3. R has a continuous parametric representation that is superhomogeneous in income.
Proof. By Proposition 1, it only remains to show that statements 2 and 3 are equivalent. First, let R be a consistent and continuous rule that satisfies merging-proofness and uniformity preserving multilateral merging-proofness. By merging-proofness and Lemma 1, R satisfies equal treatment of equals. Then, by Young (1987, Theorem 1), R is a continuous parametric rule. Let f : [a, b] × R + → R be a representation of R. Then, we show that, for each λ ∈ [a, b], f (λ , ·) is superhomogeneous. By continuity, we only have to prove that for each y 0 ≥ 0 and each pair of integers l, m with m ≥ l > 0, f (λ , my 0 /l) ≥ m f (λ , y 0 )/l. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist λ ∈ (a, b), y 0 > 0, and m > l > 0 such that
Since f is nondecreasing in the first variable (and f (a, y 0 ) = 0), there is λ * ∈ (a, λ ] such that
. . , l}, and S ≡ {l + 1, . . . , m}. Let y ∈ R N + be such that y 1 = · · · = y m = y m+1 = y 0 . Let y ≡ (y 1 , . . . , y l , y m+1 ) be such that y 1 = · · · = y l = my 0 /l and y m+1 =
Since
Then
x ≡ ( f (λ 0 , y i )) i∈N and, therefore,
Conversely, let R be a rule admitting a continuous parametric representation that is superhomogeneous in income. Then, by Corollary 1, R is merging-proof. Thus, it only remains to show that R satisfies uniformity preserving multilateral merging-proofness. Let (N, y, T ) ∈ D, S ⊆ N and S ⊆ N\S be such that for each i ∈ S ∪ S , y i = y 0 , for each i ∈ S, y i = y i + (|S |/|S|) y 0 (= (|S ∪ S |/|S|) y 0 , and
Then, by superhomogeneity,
Robustness of the axioms
We now study the robustness of our two main axioms by analyzing operators on the space of rules. An axiom is said to be preserved under an operator if any rule that satisfies the axiom is mapped by the operator into a rule that also satisfies the axiom. Considering the next operator introduced by Thomson and Yeh (2008), we will show that progressivity is slightly more robust than merging-proofness.
Given a problem (N, y, T ) and an agent i ∈ N, suppose T − ∑ j∈N\{i} y j > 0. Then this part of the revenue cannot be covered even if everyone other than i pays her full income. Thus this part can be viewed as the minimal burden imposed on agent i. For each i ∈ N, let The next proposition shows that progressivity is more robust to the minimal-burden operator than merging-proofenss. The proof of the statement regarding progressivity is provided in the appendix. Example 1 below shows that the minimal-burden operator does not preserve merging-proofness. 
Consequently,
Note that R is progressive. By Proposition 4, so is R m . Therefore, R m is an example showing that progressivity does not imply merging-proofness, as claimed in Remark 1.
For rules satisfying the following mild axiom, however, we show that the minimal-burden operator preserves merging-proofness. Suppose that an agent donates part of her income and that the donation is used to finance tax revenue. Then both the donor's income and the tax revenue go down by the amount of the donation. The next axiom says that the donor's total payment (tax plus donation) should not be lower than her total payment without donation.
No Donation Paradox. 12 For each (N, y, T ) ∈ D, each i ∈ N and each t ∈ [0, min{T, y i }],
Note that the rule in Example 1 violates no donation paradox. To show this, consider the problem (N, y, T ) = ({1, 2}, (3, 15) , 11). Then, R (N, y, T ) = (0, 11) and R (N, (3, 13) , 9) = (27/16, 117/16). Thus, R 2 (N, y, T ) = 11 > 2 + 117/16 = 2 + R 2 (N, (3, 13) , 9) .
Most of the well-known rules satisfy no donation paradox, which shows that it is indeed a mild condition. Nevertheless, it is enough to guarantee that the minimal-burden operator preserves merging-proofness, as shown in the next result. The proof is provided in the appendix.
Concluding remarks
We have shown an intimate connection between the ethical principle of progressive taxation and the strategic principle of merging-proofness. Our results give rise to dual byproducts, which also reveal an intimate connection between the dual notions of these two principles; namely, regressivity (for any pair of agents, the one with lower income should face a tax rate at least as high as the rate the other faces) and splitting-proofness. 13 Formally, for any given rule R, the dual rule of R, denoted as R * , associates with each (N, y, T ) ∈ D, R * (N, y, T ) ≡ y−R(N, y,Y −T ). A rule is self-dual if it coincides with its dual. For any given property α, α * is the dual property of α if for each rule R, R satisfies α if and only if its dual rule R * satisfies α * . Consistency, continuity and anonymity are self-dual properties (see Table 3 .2 in p.229 of Thomson, 2006) . Progressivity and regressivity are dual to each other; so are splitting-proofness and merging-proofness (e.g., de Frutos, 1999) . It is not difficult to show that changing the direction of the inequalities in the definitions of multilateral merging-proofness and uniformity perserving multilateral merging-proofness, we can define their dual properties: multilateral splitting-proofness and uniformity preserving multilateral splitting-proofness. It is known that a rule is characterized by a set of properties if and only if its dual rule is characterized by the corresponding set of dual properties (e.g., Herrero and Villar, 2001) . Similarly, if α and β are two properties and α * and β * are their corresponding dual properties, α implies β if and only if α * implies β * (e.g., Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2006) . Combining all these facts with our main results, we obtain the 12 In the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, this axiom is introduced by Thomson and Yeh (2008) . It is the dual of "claims monotonicity" (see p.100 and p.161 in Thomson, 2006) . See also Moreno-Ternero (2006) and Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006) 13 Regressivity may not be an interesting property from a fairness point of view. Nevertheless, it is an almost ubiquitous feature in the optimal taxation literature, initiated by Mirrlees (1971) , whose classical model, which assumes agents with identical preferences (on consumption and working time) but with different earning abilities, typically prioritizes the labour-discouraging effects of the income tax over its hypothetical redistributive benefit. next corollary: Corollary 2. The following statements hold: 1. Splitting-proofness and consistency together imply anonymity.
A consistent and continuous rule satisfies regressivity (splitting-proofness) if and only if
it has a continuous parametric representation that is subhomogeneous (subadditive) in income. 14 Besides obtaining logical relations between these principles, and their implications, we have also studied their robustness to the so-called minimal-burden operator. We have shown that progressivity is slightly more robust than merging-proofness, as we find an additional but mild axiom that helps the latter to be preserved by the operator. Three other operators have been considered in the literature (e.g., Thomson and Yeh, 2008) but none of them allows us to distinguish between the two principles. More precisely, both progressivity and mergingproofness are preserved under the so-called convexity operator (which maps a list of rules into the convex combination of these rules) whereas none of them is preserved under the so-called duality operator (which maps each rule into its dual rule), or under the so-called truncation operator (which maps each rule R into the rule defined, for each problem, by applying R after each income has been truncated at the tax revenue). Regarding the dual notions, it is a straightforward consequence of the previous results that both regressivity and splitting-proofness are preserved under the convexity operator whereas none of them are preserved under the duality operator, or under the minimal-burden operator. In this case, it is the truncation operator that allows us to distinguish between both axioms. The truncation operator preserves regressivity but not splitting-proofness. Splitting-proofness can be preserved after the addition of income monotonicity (if an agent increases her income, ceteris paribus, she cannot pay less taxes), the dual property of no donation paradox. 15 Finally, we acknowledge that our analysis has focused on the simplest model of taxation that exists in the literature. This model, introduced by O'Neill (1982), provides an extremely useful framework to discuss ethical and strategic principles although it has some shortcomings as a model of taxation. It is left for further research to extend our results to a more general model of taxation in which incomes would result from economic choices and negative taxation (i.e., subsidies) would be allowed. An instance of such a model has been recently studied by Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) , who look for the optimal tax on the basis of efficiency and fairness principles (and under incentive-compatibility constraints). In their model, agents have unequal skills (and, therefore, unequal earning abilities) and heterogeneous preferences over consumption and leisure (and, therefore, unequal labour time 14 A parametric representation f : 
A Proofs
Proof.
[Proof of Lemma 1] Chambers and Thomson (2002, Lemma 3) show that consistency and equal treatment of equals together imply anonymity. Thus, we only have to show that merging-proofness and consistency imply equal treatment of equals. Now, since equal treatment of equals is lifted by consistency from the two-agent case (e.g., Hokari and Thomson (2008, Theorem 1)), we can restrict ourselves to that case. More precisely, let (N, y, T ) ∈ D where N = {i, j} and y i = y j = a. We prove in two steps that the tax amounts of i and j in this problem are the same.
Step (N , (a, a, 0) , T ) = 0. By balance and consistency, R N (N , (a, a, 0) , T ) = R(N, y, T ) (second row of Table 1 -b). When agents 1 and 3 in this three-agent problem merge their incomes into the income of agent 3, we obtain a new problem ({2, 3}, (a, a), T ) (third row of Table 1-a) and, by merging-proofness, x
3 ≥ x 1 . The reverse inequality x 3 ≤ x 1 is obtained after using the symmetric argument as above, switching the roles of agents 1 and 3 (start from ({2, 3}, (a, a) , T ), the third row of Table 1 -a, and work through the problems in the fourth and the last rows applying the same reasoning as above).
Step 2. R i ({i, j}, (a, a) , T ) = R j ({i, j}, (a, a) , T ). Let k, l ∈ N\{i, j} be such that k = l. Applying Step 1 twice, first to the two problems Therefore, R i ({i, j}, (a, a), T ) = R j ({i, j}, (a, a), T ). 16 Proof. [Proof of Proposition 4] Let R be a rule satisfying progressivity. Let (N, y, T ) ∈ D and x m ≡ R m (N, y, T ). Assume, without loss of generality, that N = {1, 2, ..., n} and y 1 ≤ y 2 ≤ · · · ≤ y n . Let k ∈ N be the first agent whose minimal burden is strictly positive, i.e., y k−1 ≤ Y − T < y k . Then, m 1 (N, y, T ) = · · · = m k−1 (N, y, T ) = 0 < m k (N, y, T ) ≤ m k+1 (N, y, T ) ≤ · · · ≤ m n (N, y, T ). N, y , T ) . Then
Let i, j ∈ N be such that y i ≤ y j . There are three cases.
Case 1: y i ≤ y j < y k . By progressivity of R at (N, y , T ), x m i /y i = x i /y i ≤ x j /y j = x m j /y j . Case 2: y k ≤ y i ≤ y j . By equal treatment of equals of R at (N, y , T ) (implied by the progressivity of R), x i = x j = a. By boundedness,
Case 3: y i < y k ≤ y j . By progressivity of R at (N, y , T ),
Now, since Y − T < y j and, by boundedness, x i ≤ y i , then x i y j −Y + T ≤ y i y j −Y + T . Rearranging, we get
Therefore, combining (8) and (9),
To prove Proposition 5, we need the following additional axiom and lemma.
No donation paradox and merging-proofness together imply the following useful property, as shown in the next lemma. The property says that after an agent i donates her income to the taxation authority, the total payment faced by any pair of agents involving i should not be lowered. 16 It is clear from the proof that a much weaker version of consistency, known as null (incomes) consistency (after agents with zero income disappear, the tax amounts of others should not be affected; also called limited consistency by Thomson 2006 ; see also Ju et al. 2007 ) would suffice to prove equal treatment of equals for twoagent problems. However, to obtain equal treatment of equals for a general population and also anonymity, we appeal to the results by Chambers and Thomson (2002) and Hokari and Thomson (2008) , where full consistency plays a critical role. Hence, (full) consistency in our result cannot be replaced with the weaker axiom of null consistency. Proof. Let R be a rule satisfying merging-proofness and no donation paradox. Let (N, y, T ) ∈ D and i, j ∈ N such that T ≥ y i . By merging-proofness,
Donation
By no donation paradox, applied to agent j with donation y i at N\{i}, y i + y j , y N\{i, j} , T ,
Combining the two inequalities, we obtain
which shows donation-proofness.
Now we are ready to prove Proposition 5.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 5] Let R be a rule satisfying no donation paradox and mergingproofness. By Lemma 3, R satisfies donation-proofness. Let (N, y, T ) ∈ D. Assume, without loss of generality, that N = {1, 2, ..., n} and y 1 ≤ y 2 ≤ · · · ≤ y n . Let k ∈ N be the first agent whose minimal burden is strictly positive, i.e., k is such that y Therefore, x m i + x m j ≤x m j .
